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Upon finishing Samuel Beckett’s play Endgame, one is struck with an
absolute sense of despair: Nell is dead; Nag weeps for Nell; Hamm is seemingly
dead (or soon will be) and thinks his counterpart has left him; Clov (depending on
the production) secretly stares at his motionless father. The set itself is “bare”
with a “grey light” (Beckett 990). The one piece of art, something that might
provide transcendent escape from the banal, is turned to face the wall (Beckett
990). The world outside is just as hopeless, and even deadly, according to
Hamm—“Outside of here it’s death” (Beckett 992). Overall, the play consists of
comical, but useless, actions to fill the time until the characters “end” (Beckett
991). However, I will argue against this despairing reading of Endgame by
drawing upon Martin Heidegger’s conceptions of death and time, and of how we
relate to each of these concepts. Indeed, when we consider Beckett’s play as a
study of characters who incorrectly face their own deaths, the play’s end becomes
a threshold between despair and enduring hope.
Before examining death as a trope, we must consider why Heidegger’s
philosophy is a good heuristic for studying Beckett. Although Beckett never
explicitly referenced Heidegger, some critical literature has attempted to connect
the two writers. Steven Barfield, argues that, between these two writers there
exists an “uncanny and unsettling relationship…which shows similar
preoccupations but does not necessarily mean any influence of one to the other”
(156). Another critic, Lance St. John Butler, writes: “Beckett and Heidegger
survive in the same world…they are linked by a common ontology” (7). Both
Heidegger and Beckett, then, approach our ontology, or the study of our particular
being, in a similar way. Heidegger’s philosophy thus can be used to pull apart the
artistic intuitions that haunt Endgame.
Heidegger helpfully illuminates how death, time, and the self are all
inextricably connected. Other critics have felt this connection, but failed to
explicate it fully. K. Jeevan Kumar’s essay “The Chess Metaphor in Samuel
Beckett’s ‘Endgame’” is one such attempt. The title of Beckett’s play refers to the
last stage of a chess match in which the outcome is clear. Endgame for Beckett is
analogous to the last stages of life, and even “life itself” (Kumar 541). Kumar
provides examples of the systematic movements of a chess game that offers little
improvisation and their parallels in the play. For example, Clov, after wheeling
Hamm around the perimeter of the room, tries to place Hamm in the center of the
room. Kumar explains that this mimics a chess player’s movements around the
four center squares of a chessboard (548). However, constrained by the geometric
boundaries, Hamm will be unable to reach this center, forever searching and
dependent on Clov. Kumar calls this the unattainable center and Hamm and
Clov’s search for it “the locus of the ultimate self, [which] will remain
unfulfilled” (548).

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2011

1

Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 2 [2011], Art. 8

While Kumar’s subsequent examples show a clear connection between the
characters’ actions and the moves during a chess game, this particular example
comes closest to providing a helpful interpretation of the play. Nevertheless,
Kumar does not follow through with this insight, leaving his key phrase, “locus of
the ultimate self,” unexplored and undefined. While the strangeness and repetition
in Hamm and Clov’s actions are clear through the chess metaphor, they are not
connected to the self in Kumar’s analysis; more important, these actions are not
clearly tied to a search for the self in the face of death. In other words, Kumar has
failed to explain how Hamm and Clov tell the viewer or reader something
universal about death. How do Hamm and Clov face death, and how should we?
Heidegger examines how actions might be tied to death and self in his
essay The Concept of Time. In order to understand how time affects the self, we
must first understand what time is. He explains that “time is first encountered in
changeable entities; change is in time” (202). The passing of time is apparent to
us when objects undergo some change. Because things around us change position
or simply look different, we believe that time has passed. This idea is exploited in
science fiction or fantasy films: a person magically stops time, and all motion and
change cease as well. Heidegger believes that we mark this change in time
through many means, but most notably, in our use of clocks. He says of the
clock’s function: “The primary determination produced by the clock at any given
time is not the indication of the how-long or the how-much of time in its present
flowing, but the fixing of the now at the time” (202). Clocks therefore allow us to
divide time into segments of “now” (unlike a stop watch that merely counts the
space between two “now” points). For us, then, time becomes a series of points on
a line.
The invention of the clock itself exhibits our consciousness of our relation
to “the now” and causes one to wonder why this need to mark out the now might
exist. Beckett’s use of clocks and clock-like objects helps shed light on the
connection between clock and clock-maker. Most obvious is the timer that Clov
sets to signal Hamm regarding Clov’s death or life. The timer as it rings is
representative of blind Hamm looking at the clock and marking “the now.” If the
timer doesn’t ring, or rather “fix the now,” then Clov will be dead.
The timer’s ability to fix a point in time is therefore contingent on Clov’s
life. There is in this example a connection between death and our relation to the
present. It is we who have divided up time into segments and express our free
rational nature in this arbitrary division.
Furthermore, this point only has meaning when we recognize it as a moment.
Hamm must hear the ringing of the timer for the sound to have meaning. In other
words, the present—the “now”—is dependent on our existence. We look at a
clock and, in this action, mark the present moment. Heidegger goes so far as to
wonder (and then assert): “this time now, as I look at my watch, what is this
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now?...Am I myself the now and is my Dasein [i.e. my human being] time?”
(203). When Heidegger makes this odd claim, he means that this action, this
“fixing of the now” is a way to mark our existence as well. We create the present
by recognizing the present. Consequently, if Clov dies, Hamm might as well be
dead. Michael Worton in his essay argues that “Beckett’s pairs are bound in
friendships that are essentially power-relationships. Above all, each partner needs
to know that the other is there: the partners provide proof that they really exist by
responding and replying to each other” (71-72).Without other people to recognize
Hamm as alive, without his ability to see change in time, and finally, without his
ability to mark time as having passed with the timer, time literally stops for
Hamm.
The play then is riddled with clocks to correctly represent the characters’
fears of death— and in many cases, defective or ominous clocks. Before we
technologically conquered time, we measured it according to the natural world
and through change. We used sun dials or the seasons. In Endgame, not only have
the technological clocks, like the timer, begun to lose meaning, but also these
natural clocks become just as unreliable. The sunset, a “clock” that signifies the
passing of 12 hours, is not sinking, but instead is “gray” (Beckett 999). Gray, a
color somewhere in between day and night, makes recognition of the passing of
time impossible. The rising and setting of the sun have, as a kind of clock, a
somewhat optimistic setting. They signify hope and rebirth, a steady and
dependable cycle. The sun, being replaced by a gray sky, symbolically destroys
the possibility of rebirth and hope. Another natural clock in the play is Hamm’s
“little vein” (Beckett 995). This “dripping in his head” has begun like countdown
as his life nears its end. It is not a heart that lies in his chest which pumps his
lifeblood, but the “heart in his head,” or knowledge of his mortality that drives
him forward and haunts him (Beckett 995). Finally, the painkiller represents
another futile attempt by Hamm to keep track of time. Throughout the play Hamm
repreatedly asks Clov whether or not it is time for his painkiller, only to discover,
when it is time, that there is no corresponding action (taking the painkiller) that
can fix this moment for him—he is out of painkiller (Beckett 1010). Hamm
expresses real terror at this loss of a clock. As he nears death, now this moment,
too, has been snatched away from him.
Through these examples, one begins to see how Hamm and Clov treat
time and the fixing of time as an attempt to evade death. They believe they have
some control over the end of time, their death, if they can fill it with an action.
Worton explains that “time does not pass in this world; rather, the characters have
to find ways of passing the time. One solution adopted by Beckett’s characters is
mechanical repetition, re-enacting situations without perceiving any significance
in these repeated actions” (72). Two ideas are being stressed by Worton: first, that
the characters pass time with action, something that aligns with what Heidegger
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says about time; second, that these characters are creating their lives (literally
their time alive) through meaningless actions. Therefore, while each action
reminds them that they are not yet dead, their obsession with death is likewise an
obsession with their future selves—the selves they would like to be, but that their
meaningless actions, cannot be.
Their recognition of their failure to create meaningful selves is explicit in
their banter.
CLOV: Why this farce, day after day?
HAMM: Routine. One never knows. (Beckett 999)
Furthermore, Clov laments the quick passing of time, as their empty lives draw to
a close, by saying, “Grain upon grain, one by one, and one day, suddenly there’s a
heap, a little heap, the impossible heap” (Beckett 990). Clov here points out how
our entire lives are constructed out of moments, but it is impossible to say how
many of these moments are necessary to a complete life. At some point, all these
moments become a self, but Clov cannot predict when self-hood will arrive.
Hamm has the same fear in that he hopes that all these moments will total a
“heap,” or a self, but he does not know when this may happen:
HAMM: We’re not beginning to…to…mean something?
CLOV: Mean something! You and I, mean something!
(Brief laugh)
Ah that’s a good one! (Beckett 999).
Their only option is to continue along the path of actions, hoping they will
construct a self before their deaths.
It is their present actions that guarantee their present existence; their
existence in the future is never guaranteed. Their focus on time is therefore also a
focus not only on their existence, but also on their loss of existence—death.
Death, for the one who experiences it, is the end of time. It is the end of change.
Heidegger explains this attitude toward death by saying, “[Death] is my being
gone. As thus being gone, it uncovers my Dasein as all at once no longer there; all
of a sudden I am no longer there in the midst of such and such matter, intimate
with such and such people, surrounded by these vanities these tricks, this
verbosity” (207). A contradiction in Hamm and Clov’s lives emerges: they fill
their lives with meaningless “vanities” and “tricks” in order to live longer in
hopes of creating a selves, but their knowledge of death constantly wrenches them
out of these same activities. They are not lost in their actions; in a moment of
post-modern cynicism, they know their actions are empty but continue them
regardless.
This cynicism manifests as an aversion to faith—not necessarily spiritual
faith (although Hamm openly curses God saying “The bastard! He doesn’t
exist!”), but a faith in the point of a meaningful and fully formed self without a
guaranteed future (Beckett 1006). Our selves form slowly through the addition of
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moments, but we will never reach a fully formed self. Once this exists, it is no
more. And without God (as Beckett suggests), then life appears only an arbitrary
collection of such moments. Why should we care about having a fully formed self
if it cannot exist past death, or if we cannot know that it will even exist in the next
moment? This belief takes a kind of leap of faith: the faith that one will exist in
the next moment, and that living a good life has some purpose in spite of one’s
death.
Heidegger does not speak of faith, but he does speak of how one should
react to foreknowledge of his own death. Every human being, or Dasein, “knows
of its death and does so even when it wants to know nothing of it” (Heidegger
207). And this knowledge of death, as mentioned before, illuminates not only
one’s actions, but also the world with which one interacts. We notice the objects
of our lives and the routines in which we participate. Butler speaks of this wordly
knowledge we have, saying that “man ‘is there’, he already has some sort of
understanding of Being, his own way-of-Being is ‘existence’ which involves an
inevitable appreciation of facticity and a self-directioning towards his own
possibilities” (15). By this, Butler means that we have a past of facts, our facticity,
elements of our world we cannot change. But our future is left open. We can
direct our future actions based on facticity, but only in action do these possibilities
become facts.
There is a kind of hope in the belief that “Dasein’s past is facticity and his
future is possibility” (Butler 14). Heidegger suggests a hopeful way of orienting
our being towards our death, our past, and our possible future: being futural. He
explains that “being futural gives time, cultivates the present and allows the past
to be repeated in how it is lived” (208). Knowing about our own death gives us a
reference point for our total being, i.e. that we are a sum of moments, of free
actions and choices. In very simple terms: by looking toward the future we can
plan who we want to be. The idea of “allow[ing] the past to be repeated,” may
appear troubling to some, however, this idea is positive for Heidegger. Havi Carel
explains that “for Heidegger repetition is an explicit positive mode of reliving a
past…[and] meaningful disclosure. It is a full realisation [sic] of the historical and
social heritage passed down to the present” (121). In other words, Heidegger does
not necessarily mean just repeating someone else’s actions, but by exploring
them, and through them, trying to gain insight into a common social structure.
The important idea here is that we view our actions as making history and
influencing others’ actions as well.
The lives of Hamm and Clov are, in fact, a metaphor for this possibility of
futurity. Motivated by their fear of death, they struggle against it, frantically
filling their time. But it is this same fear of death that limits their possible being:
they fear death so much that they do not change the facts of their lives. They
remain where they are, invent stories, trying to construct a past that might give
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them hope for the future. Worton suggests that this story-telling is used to “give
the teller a belief that he or she does in fact have a past, but more importantly, to
convince a listener that a past, or at least ‘their’ past, exists.…[Hamm] is striving
not to remember his past but to construct it” (73). In reality, it is the characters’
viewpoints that prevent them from changing their current circumstances and
creating a new facticity out of which they might build a new future.
Evidence of this psychological failing can be seen in the story of the
madman Hamm tells. He speaks of a friend he had who when taken to the window
to see the “loveliness” of the world, would turn away “appalled,” for “all he had
seen was ashes” (Beckett 1002). Oddly, Hamm says that the madman “alone had
been spared” (Beckett 1002). We might infer from these words, that Hamm
himself once saw the loveliness of the world, but now it is all ashes. Hamm
believes it is better to have never known beauty than to have known it and lost it.
It is not clear however, whether or not Hamm too is mad. Because Hamm cannot
see anything (and beyond the room neither can the audience) he cannot know
whether the world has lost its beauty or not.
Furthemore, the set of Endgame has often been noted by critics to
resemble “the inside of a skull, the locus of the brain” with its two high windows
and monochromatic and bare walls (Kumar 543). This similarity seems to suggest
that the characters’ fears of the outside world result from a viewpoint constrained
by the walls of their dwelling. Hamm is unable to conceive of anything beyond
these walls. They are for Hamm his entire world, as evidenced from how “Hamm
orders Clov to wheel him round the room/stage of Endgame with the phrase
‘Right round the world!’…There is a strong feeling that Hamm is only because he
‘is in’ this world of his” (Butler 18).
Hamm’s psychology and worldview restrain him, but for Clov there might
be hope. Clov readily acknowledges that, whatever Hamm asks of him, he cannot
refuse:
CLOV: Do this, do that, and I do it. I never refuse. Why?
HAMM: You’re not able to.
CLOV: Soon I won’t do it any more.
HAMM: You won’t be able to any more.
But in these lines of dialogue, it seems that Hamm knows that Clov will not have
to refuse once Hamm is dead. Once Hamm dies, Clov is free to go. The most
hopeful moment the viewer has is the last moment where Clov stands, dressed in
traveling clothes, on stage. Beckett’s stage directions read: “[Clov] halts by the
door and stands there, impassive and motionless, his eyes are fixed on HAMM, till
the end” (Beckett 1014). Helene Keyssar, writing about directorial choices her
college theatre troupe made when performing Endgame, speaks of this scene:
The set did, however, create the problem that if we wanted Clov to
exit at the end it would either break the theatrical illusion or
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necessitate using lighting in a way totally inconsistent with the
unchanging, relentless gray hue we had chosen as appropriate. Our
final sense that Clov should remain on stage thus dawned as a
happy coincidence and reaffirmation of the persistent production
principle of doing simply what the script demanded. (236)
This choice may seem to some to be disheartening. Clov should leave, go into the
world, free from his restraint. But, in actuality, Clov’s presence on the stage is a
reminder of and emphasis upon the choice that Clov and the audience must make
at the end of the play. Knowing what they know (and what little they do know)
about the outside world, they must choose an ending for themselves. Clov stands
on the threshold between two futures: one is an uncertain one, with a different set
of facts about the world which would either leave Clov with a realm of new
possibilities or simply death. The other is a certain one, the same world he has
always known, but similarly resulting in death, though not necessarily immediate
death. The brilliance of this final scene lies in the fact that the audience must
make that leap of faith for Clov. With no concern for death because death is
inevitable, the audience must choose between an existence of certainty or an
existence of possibility.
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